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29 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General John M. Reynolds, USAF (Ret)
Chairman
Critical Collection Problems Committee

SUBJECT : Intelligence Contingency Plan for the Vietnam Theater, 25 October 1968

1. We have reviewed the CCPC study on intelligence contingency planning for the Vietnam theater and have no major problems with it. On the whole, it is a very able and impressive piece of work. Most of our earlier objections, which related to the initial set of basic assumptions, have been taken care of.

2. There is, however, one point that still strikes us as somewhat unrealistic. This is the apparent assumption on page 3 dealing with cease fire (paragraph 5 -- b -- (2)). This assumption overlooks the political considerations that a cease fire would almost certainly involve. Under any realistic scenario, allied forces would almost certainly be limited by some form of agreement restricting allied movement and placing restraints (or in some cases prohibition) on allied use of weapons.

3. As you are probably aware, an interagency committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Leslie Gelb of ISA is currently at work on the cease fire problem. The points that bother us will have to be thrashed out in the Gelb committee, on which my deputy, Mr. Allen, is the Agency representative. Since this committee is the proper forum for detailed discussion of such issues, I see no need to cavil at the position taken in the CCPC memorandum.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: Miss Page

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Orig - Gen. Reynolds
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1 - CCPC file
1 - GAC Chrono
1 - VAS Chrono

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